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PROVISIONS

1111 in in 11 Si at es Constitution, Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall'not be violated, and no
i

Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the peisons or things to
be seized.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Angie Brake appeals from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming her

conviction in Fourth District Court for attempted possession of a controlled substance,
a class A misdemeanor.

B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Angie Brake was charged by information filed in Fourth District Court on

February 9, 2000, with possession of cocaine, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i); and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class
B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37a-5(a) (R. 4).
On July 5, 2000, Brake filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence on grounds that the
search of her vehicle constituted an illegal warrantless search under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution (R. 29-40). On August 7, 2000, a
suppression hearing was held before Judge Davis (R. 41-42). On October 10, 2000,
Judge Lynn W. Davis denied Brake's Motion to Suppress in a signed memorandum
decision (R. 50-64).
On December 4, 2000, Brake entered a plea of "guilty" to attempted possession
of a controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor, conditioned upon her right to appeal
the denial of her motion to suppress (R. 73-74, 78).
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On January 29, 2001, Brake was sentenced to thirty-days in the Utah County
Jail, ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $850.00, and placed on supervised
probation for a period of twenty-four months (R. 86-88, 104).
Brake appealed her conviction to the Utah Court of Appeals (Case No.
20010204-CA). The Court of Appeals affirmed her conviction on May 31, 2002. State
v. Brake, 2002 UT App 190, 51 P.3d 31.
Brake petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari. This Court granted the
petition on October 23, 2002. State v. Brake, 59 P.3d 602.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On January 29, 2000, at approximately 11:45 p.m., Neil Castleberry, a sergeant
with the Utah County Sheriffs Office, was patrolling in the area of West Geneva Road
when he observed two vehicles—a green Nissan car and a white Chevy truck—in a small
pullout between the road and the lake (R. 102 at 14-15). Castleberry pulled in behind the
vehicles "to determine whether or not they needed assistance" (R. 102 at 15, 30).
Castleberry testified that the engine to the truck was running, but that he did not know if
the green Nissan's engine was on (R. 102 at 30). Brake, 2002 UT App 190 at f2. In
addition, nothing in the record suggests that the vehicles were either illegally parked or
in need of assistance. 2002 UT App 190 at ^[28 (Orme, j . dissenting).
Castleberry first approached the driver's side window of the green car and spoke
with an individual in the driver's seat after the driver had rolled the window down (R.
102 at 15-16, 30). The individual in the driver's seat was a young female (R. 102 at 31).
Castleberry asked the vehicle's occupants what they were doing and was informed that
3

they were sitting and talking (R. 102 at 31). Castleberry then asked the female in the
driver's seat for identification and learned that she was fifteen years old and that she had
not been driving the vehicle (R. 102 at 31). Castleberry was informed that the owner of
the vehicle was sitting in the back seat (R. 102 at 16). Brake, 2002 UT App 190 at | 3 .
Castleberry then tried to look in the vehicle but the windows were fogged (R. 102
at 16). Although Castleberry indicated that it was "difficult" for him to see, he testified
that he could see "two individuals in the back seat" (R. 102 at 16).
Castleberry then went to the driver's side rear, but could not see through the
window and so he "opened the door to be able to speak with the passenger" (R. 102 at
16, 32). When Castleberry opened the car door, he encountered the appellant, Angie
Brake (R. 102 at 16). Castleberry inquired of Brake as to whether she was the owner of
the vehicle and why a fifteen-year old was sitting in the driver's seat (R. 102 at 17, 33).
Brake informed Castleberry that she was the owner of the vehicle, that the occupants
were from San Pete County, and that she had driven the vehicle to its present location
and that the fifteen-year old sat in the driver's seat after their arrival (R. 102 at 17, 33).
Castleberry asked Brake for identification (R. 102 at 33). Brake replied that her
identification was in her purse and she pointed to the front seat and she offered to reach
forward and retrieve it (R. 102 at 17, 34-35). Castleberry did not want Brake to retrieve
it for officer safety reasons so he went around the rear of the vehicle and opened the front
door on the passenger side "to retriever her purse so that [he] could hand it to her, make
sure that there weren't any weapons" (R. 102 at 17-18, 35-36). Brake, 2002 UT App
190 at 15.
Once Castleberry opened the front door, he reached in and retrieved a purse (R.
102 at 18). As he reached for the purse, he "noticed a small white bindle containing
4
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Castlcbcrrv snbse<|uently interviewed Brake, without administering the Miranda
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drug paraphernalia that was found in the back window of the vehicle (R. 102 at 21).
Brake later informed Castleberry that the cocaine belonged to the driver of the white
truck, Juan Carlos Juarez and that everyone in both vehicles had used from that same
container (R. 102 at 25, 28).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Brake asserts that Sergeant Castleberry's opening of the front passenger door to her
vehicle constituted a warrantless search under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution that was not minimal nor was it justified either by probable cause or as a
search for weapons. Accordingly, Brake asks that this Court overturn the legal conclusion
of the Court of Appeals that the warrantless search was justified on grounds of "officer
safety"; and that this matter be remanded to the Fourth District Court with instructions
that her plea is to Ibe withdrawn, the evidence suppressed, and the matter dismissed.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE
SEARCH OF BRAKE'S VEHICLE WAS JUSTIFIED UNDER TIDE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Brake appealed from a conviction of attempted possession of a controlled
substance, a class A misdemeanor. Prior to the entry of her conditional plea, Brake filed a
motion to suppress in the trial court alleging that the search of her vehicle constituted an
illegal search and seizure requiring suppression of all evidence discovered as a result of
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course of the investigation." James, 2000 UT 80 at ^[10. However, "if no arrest is made,
an officer may make a warrantless search of the automobile only if there is probable cause
for the search" or "if the officer has a reasonable and 'articulable suspicion that the
suspect is potentially dangerous5" and "'may gain immediate control of weapons.'"
Schlosser, 11A P.2d at 1135, 1137 (citing United States v. Ross, 434 U.S. 798, 825, 102
S.Ct. 2157, 2173, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982) and quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,
1049,1052-55 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 3481, 3482-83 n.16, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983)).
Moreover, the opening of a vehicle to search for physical evidence door constitutes a
"search" under the Fourth Amendment. James, 2000 UT 80 at f 13; Schlosser, 11A P.2d
at 1135-36. See also, New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114-115, 106 S.Ct. 960, 966-67,
89L.Ed.2d81(1986).
In reaching its decision to affirm the conviction on grounds that a proper search
and seizure was performed, the Court of Appeals first concluded that a governmental
interest exists in removing unlicensed drivers from the road and that Castleberry "having
discovered an underage and unlicensed individual at the wheel of a running vehicle" was
justified in requesting identification from Brake who owned the vehicle. Brake, 2002 UT
App 190 at ^[23. However, the Court of Appeals' decision erroneously ascertained that
the vehicle was running. This indication is clearly erroneous and not supported by
Castleberry's testimony. Castleberry testified that the engine to the truck was running, but
that he did not know if the green Nissan's engine was on (R. 102 at 30).
The Court of Appeals concluded that the search of Brake's vehicle was justified
under an officer safety exception and also because the intrusion was deemed to be
minimal. The Court of Appeals cited the following facts to support its conclusion: Both
vehicles were running in a desolate and frequent crime area. An under-aged driver was
8
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The basis for which the U.S. Supreme Court found that the police officers were
justified in opening the door of the car and moving the papers in order to retrieve the VTN
of the vehicle, was because "the VIN plays an important part in the pervasive regulation
by the government of the automobile. A motorist must surely expect that such regulation
will on occasion require the State to determine the VIN of his or her vehicle, and the
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy in the VIN is thereby diminished. This is
especially true in the case of a driver who has committed a traffic violation." 106 S.Ct. at
965.
Furthermore the Court concluded, "it is unreasonable to have an expectation of
privacy in an object required by law to be located in a place ordinarily in plain view from
the exterior of the automobile. The VINfs mandated visibility makes it more similar to the
exterior of the car than to the trunk or glove compartment. The exterior of a car, of course,
is thrust into the public eye, and thus to examine it does not constitute a "search.'1" Id. at
966. The Supreme Court also stated that even though the interior of an vehicle is not
subject to the same expectations of privacy that exist within one's home, a car's interior as
a whole is nonetheless subject to Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable
intrusions by the police. Id.
The facts in Class are very distinguishable from those of the present case. In the
present case, the officer was not searching for a VIN of the automobile and had not pulled
the automobile over for any violations of the law. The vehicle was parked legally and the
officer had no reason to retrieve the VIN of the vehicle.
By basing their majority opinion on the outcome of Class, the Court of Appeals
ignores both the distinguishing facts of this case and prior Utah case law concerning the
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search of the interior of a vehicle for weapons in the course of an investigatory stop.
Brake, 2002 UT App 190 atffi[28-31(Orme, j . dissenting).
For example prior Utah cases establish that an officer may only conduct a weapons
search if he "reasonably believes a suspect is dangerous and may obtain immediate control
of weapons." State v. Bradford, 839 P.2d 866, 870 (Utah App. 1992). For such a search
to be justified, however, "a reasonably prudent [person] in the circumstances [must
believe] that his safety... was in danger." State v. Roybal, 116 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah 1986).
Brake maintains that Castleberry's warrantless search of the passenger
compartment was not a minimal intrusion and that it was not supported by "reasonable
and articulable suspicion" that Brake or the other occupants of the vehicle were dangerous
or that there were weapons present. State v. Schlosser, 11A P.2d 1132, 1135, 1137-38
(Utah 1989). "An officer may search a vehicle for weapons if he has a reasonable belief
that the suspect is dangerous and 'may gain immediate control of weapons.'" Schlosser,
11A P.2d at 1137 (quoting Long, 463 U.S. at 1049, 103 S.Ct. at 3481). However, "'due
weight must be given, not to [the officer's] inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
'hunch,' but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the
facts in light of his experience.'" Schlosser, 11A P.2d at 1137 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals main opinion completely ignores this Court's
prior decision in State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446 (Utah 1996). In Chapman, this Court
held that "a weapons search was not warranted, even though the suspect was a gang
member who had reputedly carried a weapon in the past, where 'nothing about the nature
of the underlying offense being investigated'—i.e., parking on school property after hours-'prompted a concern for safety... [and] [n]othing defendant, did, by way of conduct,
11

attitude, or gesture, suggested the presence of a weapon in the vehicle.'" Brake, 2002 UT
App 190 at Tf30 (Orme, J. dissenting) (quoting Chapman, 921 P.2d at 454).
In Chapman, the officer, upon discovering the illegally parked vehicle, pulled
behind the vehicle and turned his warning lights on the defendant's vehicle. Chapman,
921 P.2d at 448.

The officer did not see any weapons, he only had knowledge that the

defendant had the reputation of carrying a weapon and that he was a known gang
member. Nothing about being illegally parked in a school parking lot, by its very nature,
suggested the presence of weapons and therefore this Court concluded that the officer was
not justified in searching for weapons to ensure his own safety.
In this case, similarly, Brake asserts that the officer was not justified in making any
search for weapons for his safety, because "nothing about a motorist possibly needing
assistance, or even underage driving, by its very nature suggests the presence of
weapons." Brake, 2002 UT App 190 at |31 (Orme, J. dissenting). Castleberry, the
officer, testified that he originally stopped and approached Brake's vehicle to determine
whether or not they needed assistance (R. 102 at 15, 30). Upon approaching the parked
vehicle, Castleberry found that an underage driver was sitting in the driver's seat of the
vehicle (R. 102 at 16, 31). Accordingly, Brake asserts that the officer was not justified to
search even part of the interior of the vehicle for weapons while conducting his
investigation of underage driving and that all evidence found as a result of the search
should have been suppressed. Id. The officer did not see any weapons, did not observe in
furtive movements or other conduct consistent with the presence of a weapon, and the
officer had no reason to believe that weapons were present. Id.

12

Accordingly, Brake asks that this Court overturn the legal conclusion of the Court
of Appeals that the warrantless search was justified under the Fourth Amendment on
grounds that it was a minimal intrusion supported by reasons of "officer safety".

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Brake asks that this Court reverse the decision of the
Court of Appeals and that this matter be remanded to the Fourth District Court with
instructions that her plea is to be withdrawn, the evidence suppressed, and the matter
dismissed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17TH day of March, 2003.

Margaret P Lindsay
Counsel for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I delivered four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief Of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300
South, Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 17th day of
March, 2003.
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STATE v. BRAKE

Utah

31

Cite as 51 P.3d 31 (UtahApp. 2002)

ft is adequate because the trial court was
sufficiently familiar with the case to make
+jje determination without a precise affidavit.
Each requirement is discussed in order below.
[12] 1119 First, while Sieg omitted the
legal basis for seeking attorney fees from his
affidavit, this does not warrant reversal by
itself because the parties and the judge knew
the legal basis for seeking attorney fees. In
Ball v. NACM Intermountain, Inc., 1999 UT
97, 988 P.2d 942, the supreme court held that
because both the court and counsel were
aware of the legal basis for seeking attorney
fees, there was no prejudice from a failure to
state a legal basis in the affidavit. See id. at
H21. In this case, the trial court and counsel
knew that the Agreement provided the legal
basis for attorney fees. Therefore, Sieg's
omission does not warrant reversal.
; 1120 Second, the affidavit states the number of hours the attorney spent in prosecuting the matter. Sieg details the number of
hours his attorney and an associate worked
on the case as well as the rate at which each
billed. Therefore, Sieg's counsel complied
with the second requirement of rule 4-505(1).
[13] 1121 Finally, Premier argues that
Sieg failed to explain the nature of the services his attorney rendered. Under Utah
law, the party claiming attorney fees is required to provide the trial court with sufficient evidence to allow a determination of
reasonableness. See Cabrera u Cottrell, 694
P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1985). Although the
evidence Sieg produced at trial is not ideal, it
is sufficient because the parties and the trial
court knew that the dispositive issue in this
case was whether there was adequate consideration to support a sale or exchange. The
record shows that the trial court was very
familiar with this issue and the quality of the
work Sieg's counsel provided. Therefore,
under the facts of this case and the discretion
accorded to the trial court, the evidence presented was sufficient to affirm the award of
attorney fees.
CONCLUSION
If 22 In sum, the transfer of the Property
from Sieg to MJTM was not supported by

consideration so as to constitute a sale or
exchange. Because no sale or exchange occurred, Sieg owes no commission under the
Agreement. Since Sieg has prevailed below
and on appeal, he was correctly awarded
attorney fees and is entitled to fees incurred
on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the trial
court's decision on both issues and remand to
the trial court to determine the amount of
reasonable attorney fees Sieg is entitled to as
a result of this appeal.
II23 WE CONCUR: NORMAN H.
JACKSON, Presiding Judge, and WILLIAM
A. THORNE JR., Judge.

5>

= KEY NUMBER SYSTEM

2002UTApp 190

STATE of Utah, Appellee,
v.
Angie BRAKE, Appellant.
No. 20010204-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
May 31, 2002.

After denial of her motion to suppress
evidence of cocaine found in vehicle, defendant pled guilty in the Fourth District Court,
Provo Department, Lynn W. Davis, J., to
attempted possession of a controlled substance. Defendant appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Thorne, J., held that: (1) police officer's request for defendant's driver's license
was justified and reasonable; (2) officer's concern for safety justified officer's warrantless
entry into vehicle to retrieve purse; and (3)
officer's retrieval of purse from vehicle, to
extent action constituted a search, was minimally intrusive in furtherance of legitimate
public safety concerns.
Affirmed.
Orme, J., dissented and filed an opinion.
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1. Criminal Law <3=>1139,1158(4)
In reviewing a motion to suppress, a
trial court's factual findings are reviev/ed
deferentially under the clearly erroneous
standard, and its conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness with some discretion
given to the application of the legal standards
to the underlying factual findings.
2. Arrest <s=>63.5(9)
Police officer's request for driver's license of vehicle owner who was sitting in
back seat of the running vehicle parked on
side of road was justified and reasonable,
where officer had originally asked girl m
driver's seat for a valid driver's license, put
girl informed officer she was too young to
have a driver's license and that the vehicle
owner was sYrtnng in tiie "back seat. 13 .S.C-kConstAmend. 4; U.CA.1953, 41-6-165, 41-81(1).
3. Searches and Seizures <3=>65
Police officer's warrantless entry into vehicle to retrieve occupant's purse from frtfnt
passenger seat, upon being told by occupant,
who was in back seat, that her identification
was in purse, was justified in light of officer's
concerns for his safety, and thus constitutionally permissible; officer was unable to gee
into backseat due to the darkness and fogged
windows, there were a total of five individuals in two vehicles that appeared to be running, officer was in a desolate and high crifne
area, and purse was located in dark area out
of his control. U.S.CA. ConstAmend. 4.
4. Searches and Seizures <£=>65
To the extent that police officer's action
constituted a search, officer's warrantless entry into vehicle to retrieve occupant's putse
from front passenger seat, upon being told
by occupant, who was in back seat, that her
identification was in purse, was focused and
minimally intrusive in furthering legitimate
public safety concern, and thus constitutionally permissible, where officer did not root
through the interior of the vehicle, did pot
reach into any compartments, and did pot
open any containers. U.S.CA Copst.
Amend. 4.

Margaret P. Lindsay, Aldrich Nelson
Weight & Esplin, Provo, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General, and
Kenneth A Bronston, Assistant Attorney
General, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges BENCH, ORME, and
THORNE.
OPINION
THORNE, Judge.
111 Appellant Angie Brake (Brake) appeals
from a conviction for Attempted Possession
of a Controlled Substance, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 5837-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp.1999). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
112 On January 29, 2000, at approximately
11:45 p.m., Utah County Deputy Sheriff Neil
Castleberry (Castleberry) observed two vehicles stopped in a small pullout on the side
of the road west of the Geneva Steel plant.
Castleberry pulled up behind the vehicles to
inquire whether the occupants of either vehicle needed assistance. Because he was
merely mquiring whether anyone needed assistance, Castleberry did not have his emergency lights on when he approached the vehicles. Castleberry, however, was aware
that the vehicles were stopped in an ..area
"known for frequent criminal activity."
113 Upon exiting his vehicle, Castleberry
approached one of the two vehicles, a green
Nissan, which he beheved had the engine
running. Castleberry observed a young
woman in the driver's seat. He asked the
^WSSSOSt <&> ^<&. <&£>TOi ^ k ^ 'TON&STO, ^ ^ & <&&.

did, and then he asked for her driver license.
The woman told Castleberry that she was
fifteen years-old and that she did not have a
driver license. The woman also told Castleberry that she had not been driving the
vehicle. Castleberry then inquired about the
vehicle's owner, and the woman told him that
the vehicle's owner was sitting in the backseat.
114 Because the vehicle's windows were
fogged, Castleberry was unable to see clearly
into the backseat. He was able, however, to
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see that two persons, a male and a female,
were sitting in the backseat. Because his
vision was obscured, Castleberry opened the
backseat door to speak to the two persons.
Brake, who was sitting in the backseat, identified herself as both the vehicle's owner and
the driver. Brake told Castleberry that she
and the others, including the individuals in
the other vehicle, were from Sanpete County.
She also told Castleberry that she had
changed seats with the fifteen-year-old when
they arrived at their current location.

claimed ownership because she owned the
vehicle. Brake then admitted that the cocaine belonged to her and that she and the
others had used the cocaine throughout the
evening. Castleberry arrested Brake and
called for backup. A subsequent search of
the Nissan uncovered drug paraphernalia.
118 Brake was bound over on charges of
possessing a controlled substance and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. Brake
subsequently filed a motion to suppress both
the cocaine and her mmminating state2
115 Castleberry asked Brake for her identi- ments. The trial court denied Brake's Mofication. Brake told Castleberry that her tion as it pertained to the admissibility of the
identification was in her purse and pointed to cocaine and granted her Motion pertaining to
the front passenger seat, where no one was her mcriminating statements.
U 9 In denying that portion of Brake's Mositting. Because the purse was located "in a
dark area over which he h[ad] no control[J"* tion to Suppress, the trial court concluded
Castleberry decided, for safety reasons, to that opening the vehicle's front passenger
retrieve the purse himself. Castleberry door to retrieve the purse was justifiable
walked around to the passenger side of the under the officer safety exception to the
front seat and opened the vehicle door to Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.
retrieve the purse. As Castleberry reached The trial court relied upon the following facts
inside the vehicle to remove the purse, he in reaching its decision:
saw, in plain view, a white bindle next to the
1. [Castleberry] was alone on patrol and
purse near the vehicle's console.
had not yet called for backup.
2. It was late at night; it was dark and
116 Castleberry picked up the purse and
none of the occupants lived in Utah
asked for its owner. Someone sitting in the
County.
Nissan told Castleberry that the purse be3. The road is located in a remote area of
longed to "Lilly," and that she was sitting in
Utah County and . . . Castleberry dethe other vehicle. Castleberry took the purse
scribed it as a "deserted road."
and the bindle over to the other vehicle. He
opened the vehicle's door and asked for Lilly.
4. There were two vehicles at the site
Castleberry also asked the persons sitting in
with occupants in each (three occuthe vehicle if the purse belonged to Lilly.
pants in the subject vehicle and two
One of the two persons identified herself as
occupants in the pickup truck which
Lilly and told Castleberry that she owned
was parked contiguous).
the purse. Lilly, however, denied owning the
5. This was an area of frequent criminal
bindle. Castleberry had Lilly exit the vehiactivity.
cle and continued to question her at his
6. [Castleberry's] vision was severely repatrol car. He also tested the white powstricted because of the darkness and
dery substance contained in the bindle, which
the fact that all of the windows were
tested positive for cocaine.
fogged up.
1f 7 Castleberry proceeded back to the Nis7. The other vehicle was rurming and . . .
san and asked the three individuals who
Castleberry testified he believed that
owned the cocaine. Castleberry received no
the subject vehicle had the engine on
response from them. Unable to determine
with a fifteen-year-old unlicensed girl
who owned the cocaine, Castleberry told
behind the wheel and two other pasBrake that she would be arrested if no one
sengers in the back seat.
1« This quote comes from the trial court's Ruling
on Motion to Suppress, II10

I. Castleberry had questioned Brake before administering her Miranda warning

3 4 Xitah
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K 10 As a result of the trial court's deer
sion, Brake pleaded guilty to attempted pos^
session of a controlled substance. She condr
tioned her plea on the right to appeal th£
trial court's partial denial of her Motion W
Suppress. This appeal followed.
ISSUE AND STANDAED OF REVIEW
[1] Ull Brake argues the trial court
erred by denying that portion of her Motiotf
to Suppress alleging that by opening th#
passenger door to obtain the purse, Castle'
berry's actions constituted an impermissible
warrantless search. In reviewing £ motion
to suppress, "[a] trial court's factual finding^
are reviewed deferentially under the clearly
erroneous standard, and its conclusions of
law are reviewed for correctness with some
standards to the underlying factual findings/
State v. Loya, 2001 UT App 3, 116, 18 P.3d
1116.
ANALYSIS
[2-4] II12 Brake argues that Castleberry
conducted an impermissible warranties^
search when he opened the Nissan's front
passenger door to retrieve the purse, and
therefore, violated her Fourth Amendment
right against unreasonable searches and seizures. To support her argument, Brake relies upon State v, Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132
(Utah 1989).
1f 13 In Schlosser, a Utah Highway Patrol
trooper stopped a vehicle for a traffic violation. See id at 1133. As the vehicle pulled
to the side of the road, the trooper observed
the defendant, a passenger in the vehicle,
the left and to the right, and turning back to
look at the [trooper]." Id. The movement
drew the trooper's attention.

defendant's behavior, the trooper concluded
that the defendant "was trying to hide something." Id. The trooper approached the passenger side of the vehicle, tapped on the
window, and opened the door. See id. The
trooper "scanned the interior of the truck for
contraband and saw a bag of marijuana in
the passenger door pocket." Id The trooper
also "smelled marijuana smoke." Id The
trooper arrested both the defendant and the
driver.
1115 The defendant moved to suppress the
marijuana.3 The trial court granted the defendant's motion and suppressed "all the evidence seized." Id The trial court concluded
that the trooper "acted on 'a mere suspicion
that the defendant . . . was engaged in criminal activity,' and had no legal basis for the
search and seizure." Id (citation omitted).
The State appealed.
1116 The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court's ruling. See id. at 1139. The
court concluded that the trooper's opening
the vehicle door was a "search." Id at 1135.
The court also concluded that the search was
unlawful. See id at 1135-36. The court
reasoned that
[the trooper's] testimony established that
his opening the car door exceeded the
legitimate objectives of a traffic stop. The
[trooper's] "clear initial objective" in opening the car door was to see whether [the
defendant] was "hiding something." However, without probable cause to justify it,
that act clearly exceeded the lawful scope
of a legitimate government interest.
Id.
1117 Finally, the court explained that the
for his actions; he sought only to investigate
the possibility that defendants were engaged
in illegal activity." Id at 1137. Because of
the safety concerns in the present case, we
conclude that Schlosser is inapplicable to the
present matter.

1114 After the vehicle stopped, the driver
exited the vehicle, approached the trooper,
and presented the trooper his license and
registration. See id. at 1133-34. All the
while, the trooper noticed that the defendant
"continued to move about the cab of the
truck." Id. at 1134. As a result of the

1118 The facts and the reasoning set forth
in New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106,106 S.Ct.
960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986), are applicable to
the present matter. In Class, the United

3. The defendant also moved to suppress drug
paraphernalia and two firearms, which the

trooper discovered while searching the vehicle
See id
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States Supreme Court held that a minimally
intrusive warrantless search was justified in
light of the Fourth Amendment protection
against unreasonable searches when balanced against concerns for police officer safety. See id. at 117-18, 106 S.Ct. at 967-68.
1119 In Class, police officers stopped the
defendant for two traffic violations. See tc£
at 107-08, 106 S.Ct. at 962. Upon stopping
his vehicle, the defendant exited and approached one of the two officers conducting
the stop. See id. at 108, 106 S.Ct. at 963.
While one of the officers spoke with the
defendant, the other officer proceeded to the
defendant's vehicle and opened the door in
an effort to locate the VIN number. See id.
The officer was unable to locate the VIN
number on the doorjamb, and, subsequently,
he reached into the vehicle's interior to remove some papers that obscured the area of
the dashboard where the VIN number was
also located. See id* Upon doing so, th^
officer saw a gun protruding from under*
neath the driver's seat. See id. The officers
arrested the defendant. See id.
120 The defendant filed a motion to suppress the gun, which the trial court denied,
See id. Ultimately, the New York Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court, concluding
that the officer's intrusion into the vehicle
was a search that was not justified because
the facts of the case " 'reveal no reason for
the officer to suspect other criminal activity
[besides the traffic infractions] or to protect
his own safety.' " Id. at 109, 106 S.Ct. at 963
(quoting State v. Class, 63 N.Y2d 491, 483
N.Y.S.2d 181, 472 N.E.2d 1009, 1012 (1984)),
1121 The United States Supreme Court
reversed. The Court determined that "the
governmental interest in highway safety
served by obtaining the VIN is of the first
order, and the particular method of obtaining
the VIN here was justified by a concern for
the officers' safety." Id at 118, 106 S.Ct. at
968. The Court reasoned that "[t]he search
was focused in its objective and no more
intrusive than necessary to fulfill that objective." Id
H 22 As a result, the Court held that
4. Utah Code Ann § 41-6-165 (1998), states "It
is unlawful for the owner
of any vehicle
knowingly to permit the operation of such vehi-

this search was sufficiently unintrusive to
be constitutionally permissible in light of
the lack of reasonable expectation of privacy in the VIN and the fact that the officers
observed respondent commit two traffic
violations. Any other conclusion would expose police officers to potentially grave
risks without significantly reducing the intrusiveness of the ultimate conduct—viewing the VIN—which, as we have said, the
officers were entitled to do as part of an
undoubtedly justified traffic stop.
Id. at 119,106 S.Ct. at 968.
U23 The Utah Supreme Court has held
that a governmental interest exists in "removing unlicensed drivers from the road for
public safety reasons." State v. Harmon,
910 P.2d 1196, 1203 (Utah 1995) (addressing
the public safety concerns of individuals driving with a suspended license). Moreover,
Utah Code Ann. § 41-8-1(1) (1998) prohibits
a person under sixteen years old from operating a motor vehicle. And, Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-6-165 (1998) makes it a crime for a
vehicle's owner to allow an'underage and
unlicensed person to operate that vehicle.4
Having discovered an underage and unlicensed individual at the wheel of a running
vehicle, we conclude that it was both justifiable and reasonable for Castleberry to request from Brake, the vehicle's owner, her
driver license "in light of the governmental
interest in removing unlicensed drivers from
the road for public safety reasons." Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1203.
1f24 Our conclusion that Castleberry was
both justified and reasonable in his request
to Brake, also leads this court to conclude
that the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in Class, concerning police officer
safety, is applicable in this matter. Specifically, in the situation facing Castleberry, he
was justified in his decision to retrieve the
purse.
U 25 Castleberry approached two vehicles,
both of which he believed to be running, in a
desolate and frequent crime area. After he
had encountered the Nissan's occupants,
cle upon a highway in any manner contrary to
law." Id
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Castleberry discovered that (1) the individual
in the Nissan's driver's seat was fifteen
years-old and did not possess a driver license; (2) due to the darkness and fogged up
windows, he was unable to see clearly into
the Nissan's backseat to identify the passengers sitting in the backseat; (3) the individuals in both vehicles totaled five; and (4) the
purse was located ui a dark area out of his
control.

or emergency flashers were activated. Second, the officer expressly testified that he
elected to open the one vehicle's front door
and retrieve the purse so that he could
"make sure that there weren't any weapons." x

If 29 Utah law concerning the search of the
interior of a vehicle for weapons, in the
course of an investigatory stop, is clear. As
explained in a series of cases, none of which
1126 When Castleberry set out to retrieve are cited in the main opinion, an officer may
the purse, "[t]he search was focused in its conduct a weapons search only if he "reasonobjective and no more intrusive than neces- ably believes a suspect is dangerous and may
sary to fulfill that objective." Class, 475 U.S. obtain immediate control of weapons." State
at 118,106 S.Ct. at 968. As in Class, Castle- v Bradford, 839 P.2d 866, 870 (Utah CtApp.
berry did not "root about the interior of 1992). This regimen also applies to traffic
[Brake's vehicle]." Id. Further, "[Castleber- stops, even though they are regarded as
ry] did not reach into any compartments or potentially dangerous. See id. at 869. Such
open any containers." Id. Ultimately, Cast- a search is justified only if " 'a reasonably
leberry's "safety [and a legitimate public prudent [person] in the circumstances would
safety concern] w[ere] served by the [mini- be warranted in the belief that his safety
mal] governmental intrusion." Id. at 117, was in danger.' " State v. Roybal, 716 P.2d
106 S.Ct. at 968. The trial court's decision to 291, 293 (Utah 1986) (quoting Terry v. Ohio,
deny Brake's Motion to Suppress, as it re- 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1883, 20
lates to Castleberry's retrieval of the purse, L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). And such a belief can
is therefore affirmed.5
originate in the officer's contemporaneous
1127 I CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH, observations—either of a weapon or of some
furtive movements consistent with retrieval
Judge.
of a weapon—or in the inherent nature of the
underlying
offense. See State v. Chapman,
ORME, Judge (dissenting).
921 P.2d 446, 454 (Utah 1996).
1128 Two facts, omitted from the main
1130 Thus, in Bradford, a weapons search
opinion, bear mention. First, the officer ostensibly set about to see if the occupants of was permitted not because of a generalized
the lawfully parked vehicles needed assis- safety concern or because the intrusion was
tance even though nothing in the record sug- deemed slight, but because the officer nogests a trunk or hood was open, jacks and a ticed the driver pull a black bag toward the
spare tire were positioned by either vehicle, front of the car from an area where the
5.

Contrary to the dissent's conclusion, Castleberry neither requested nor conducted a weapons
search of either the vehicle or llie purse Castleberry merely retrieved the purse from a dark
area within the vehicle that was outside of his
immediate control and sought to convey the
purse to its owner Castleberry did not search
the purse, and therefore, as we stated above, to
the extent that Castleberry's action constituted a
search it was focused m its objective and no
more intrusive than necessary See New York v
Class, 475 U S at 118, 106 S Ct at 968 Ultimately, Castleberry's action helped to ensure not
only his safety, but also the safety of those in the
vehicle

1. As pomted out m footnote 5 of the mam opinion, the officer's purpose—to "make sure that

there weren't any weapons"—was not disclosed
to the occupants of the vehicle Contrary to the
claim in that footnote, however, the officer candidly admitted this was his purpose in entering
the vehicle and retrieving the purse himself—this
is not something I have created from whole
cloth The officer satisfied himself that there
were no weapons m the area where he located
the purse It is true he did not search the purse,
but at that pomt m time he had seen the bindle
and the focus of the encounter had therefore
dramatically changed
Moreover, the record
does not disclose trie size, shape, or weight of the
purse It is entirely possible the officer did not
search the purse only because its size, shape, and
weight were inconsistent with the possibility it
contained a firearm
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officer earlier observed a rifle. See 839 P.2d
at 871. And in State v. Strickhng, 844 P.2d
979 (Utah CtApp.1992), a weapons search
was upheld where a vehicle's occupants were
suspected of involvement in a burglary. See
id. at 984 (noting " 'ft]t is reasonable for an
officer to believe that a burglar may be
armed with weapons' ") (quoting State v.
Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985)). Conversely, in reversing this court in Chapman,
the Utah Supreme Court held a weapons
search was not warranted, even though the
suspect was a gang member who had reputedly carried a weapon in the past, where
" *[n]othing about the nature of the underlying offense being investigated' "—i.e., parking on school property after hours—
" 'prompted a concern for safety . . .
[and][n]othing defendant did, by way of conduct, attitude, or gesture, suggested the
presence of a weapon in the vehicle.' " State
v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 454 (Utah 1996)
(quoting State v. Chapman, 841 P.2d 725, 732
(Utah CtApp.1992) (Orme, J., dissenting)).
1131 Applying the correct legal doctrine to
this case, rather than the jurisprudence
which has developed concerning law enforce1
ment's entitlement to ascertain a vehicle
identification number, leads to the opposite
result from that reached by the majority.
The officer did not see any weapons, nor
does the record suggest he observed any
furtive movements or other conduct consistent with the retrieval or presence of a weapon. And nothing about a motorist possibly
needing assistance, or even underage driving,
by its very nature suggests the presence of
weapons. It follows that the officer was not
entitled to search even part of the interior of
the vehicle for weapons while conducting his
investigation of possible underage driving,
and that all evidence found as a result of that
search should have been suppressed.
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,

Michael BUNTING, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 20010016-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 6, 2002.

Defendant pled guilty in the Third District Court, Salt Lake Department, Timothy
R. Hanson, J., to child abuse homicide. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, Billings, Associate P.J., held that: (1) misrepresentations by detectives during interview
with defendant were not sufficient to overcome defendant's will; (2) statements by detective during interview with defendant did
not constitute threats or suggestions of leniency which had overcome defendant's free
to have induced defendant into making incriminating statements; (3) detectives, in conducting interview with defendant, did not
employ "false friend technique" to induce
defendant to make incriminating statements;
and (4) tactics by detectives during interview
with defendant did not exploit any known
mental or psychological condition of defendant to induce incriminating statements.
Affirmed.
1. Criminal Law <3=1158(4)
In reviewing the denial of defendant's
motion to suppress, an appellate court recites
the facts in a light most favorable to the trial
court's findings.
2. Criminal Law <s=*1134(3)
The ultimate determination of voluntariness of incriminating statements is a legal
question that an appellate court reviews for
correctness. U.S.CA. Const.Amends. 5, 14.
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^
3. Criminal Law <3=>1158(1)
An appellate court sets aside a trial
court's factual findings only if they are clearly erroneous.

FILED

/D'/O-eo

Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah
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—Deputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

RULING ON MOTION TO
SUPPRESS
CASE NO. 001400514

vs.

DATE: OCTOBER 10, 2000
JUDGE: LYNN W.DAVIS

ANGffiM BRAKE
Defendant.

CLERK: SGJ

Defendant, Angie M. Brake, filed her Motion to Suppress on July 5, 2000. A
suppression hearing was conducted on August 7, 2000. Defendant was present and was
represented by Mr. Paul Dewitt, Esq. Mr. David Clark, Deputy Utah County Attorney,
represented the State of Utah.
The matter was taken under advisement and the State of Utah was given time to file a
memorandum. The State filed its Motion and Memorandum in Opposition to the Defendant's
Motion to Suppress on August 15, 2000.
The Court, having considered the testimony at the hearing, arguments of counsel, and
legal memoranda, now finds and rules as follows:
1.

On January 29, 2000, Deputy Castlebeny of the Utah County Sheriffs Office was

on patrol alone in an isolated area of Utah County on a road which goes along Utah Lake by the
Lindon Boat Harbor and which is directly west of the Geneva Steel Plant.
2.

Officer Castlebeny testified that this is an area that "has been known to frequent

criminal activity." Transcript at page 33.
3.

It was a dark, cold winter night at approximately 11:45 p.m. when Officer

Castlebeny spotted two vehicles off the road. Officer Castlebeny stopped to investigate and "to
determine whether or not they needed assistance. . ." Transcript at page 15. One vehicle was a
white pickup truck and the other was a Nissan passenger vehicle.

4.

He noted that both vehicles appeared to have occupants. The pickup truck was

running and he thought the Nissan vehicle was probably running.
5.

The windows of the vehicle were fogged, making visibility inside the vehicle

impossible. Castleberry at 16(15-20).
6.

A fifteen-year-old girl was in the driver's seat of the vehicle while defendant was

sitting in the rear seat with another passenger who had difficulty in understanding or
communicating in English. Castleberry at 17 (1-15).
7.

Because it was past curfew, and a juvenile was present who was not licensed to

drive the vehicle, Deputy Castleberry sought identification from defendant who claimed to be the
owner of the vehicle. Castleberry at 17 (20).
8.

Deputy Castleberry testified that his intentions were to warn the occupants of the

curfew violation and in this case, "I would tell them they were only 15 minutes past curfew, it's
time to be headed for home." But during the conversation he then learned that all the occupants
were from San Pete County. He wanted further to check to see if anyone was licensed to drive
the vehicle. Castleberry at 37 (16-18).
9.

After talking with the juvenile in the driver's seat, Deputy Castleberry then

opened the rear door on the driver's side of the vehicle to speak with defendant because he was
unable to see her through the window or from his vantage at the driver's open window.
10.

Officer Castleberry asked defendant for identification. Defendant indicated or

pointed to a purse in the front passenger seat. Officer Castleberry testified that he decided to
retrieve the license because it was located in a dark area over which he had no control.
Castleberry at 17(6-7).
11.

Officer Castleberry, for safety reasons, then retrieved the purse himself. "I

opened the door to reach in to retrieve what I believed to be her purse. . . As I reached for the
purse, I noticed a small white bindle containing a wliite powdery substance sitting adjacent to the
purse on the front seal." The bindle was in plain view on the passenger seat between the purse
-2-

and the console. The purse on the front seat did not belong to the defendant. While her driver's
license was ultimately obtained, it was not obtained from the purse on the front seat. Castleberry
at 18(18-22).
12.

Defendant's purse, containing her license, was located later by Officer Castleberry

in the front passenger area of the vehicle. He could not recall whether it was in the glove
compartment or the floor area, but was not on the front seat.
13.

Subsequent to entering the vehicle, finding the evidence, and seizing the drugs,

Deputy Castleberry spoke with defendant regarding the alleged drugs he found. That questioning
was conducted without giving defendant her Miranda warnings. Castleberry at 42 (9-11).
14.

Deputy Castleberry questioned defendant after finding the illegal drugs. He

further testified that (1) he planned on arresting someone for the illegal drugs; (2) that person
would be defendant if no one else claimed the drugs; and (3) that defendant was not free to leave
during questioning. Castleberry at 41 (11-25) - 42 (1-8).
15.

Specifically, during the questioning of defendant, Miss Brake asked the deputy

what was going to happen. Deputy Castleberry told her, "I said, if I cannot determine who owns
the cocaine at this point inasmuch as you are the owner of the vehicle, you are responsible for
what is inside your vehicle, that I would arrest you for possession of cocaine if no one came forth
and claimed possession of it." Castleberry at 20 (21-25) - 21 (1-5).
16.

Officer Castleberry had called for backup and Officer Chipman arrived. He

conducted a further search of the Nissan as Officer Castleberry continued his investigation and
questioning of the occupants of both vehicles.
17.

Officer Chipman located, in plain view, a tin canister that had a straw in it and a

razor blade. These items were located "up against the back window" of the Nissan near where
the defendant was sitting.
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EL
ISSUES
Defendant moves to suppress the evidence in this case because the search of the subject
vehicle was conducted without a warrant and because statements by the defendant to Officer
Castleberry were made without a Miranda warning.
ISSUE NO. 1
Was Sgt. Castleberry's warrantless search of the defendant's vehicle, which took
place when the officer opened the front passenger door of the defendant's vehicle,
permissible and justified?
The prosecution bears the burden of establishing a constitutionally recognized exception
to the warrant requirement to substantiate a search. State v. Arrov, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990).
State v. Shoulderblade. 905 P. 2d 289 (Utah, 1995). The State of Utah relies upon a Washington
Court of Appeals case, State v. Grinier. 659 P.2d 550 (Wash. App. 1983), which stands for the
proposition that "if circumstances either place the police in danger or create a risk of loss or
destruction of evidence, a warrantless search is permissible." Id. at 552 (Emphasis added.) If this
is a paramount rule of law, one would certainly think there would be a case out of this
jurisdiction, and some case other than a Washington intermediate court of appeals to announce it.
This Court has carefully reviewed the testimony regarding Deputy Castleberry's
decision to retrieve defendant's driver's license as contained in direct examination (Transcript,
page 17, line 10-25; page 18, line 1 - 22) and cross examination (Transcript, page 33, lines 1425, and page 34, page 35, page 36, lines 1 - 25). Copies are attached.
Officer Castleberry testified that he intended to retrieve the purse out of a sense of
personal safety and to inspect the purse/area for weapons. Did he have sufficient justification to
be concerned? These are the "officer safety" facts:
1.

Ke was alone on patrol and had not yet called for backup.
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2.

It was late at night; it was very dark and none of the occupants lived in Utah

3.

The road is located in a remote area of Utah County and Officer Castleberry

County.

described it as a "deserted road."
4.

There were two vehicles at the site with occupants in each, (three occupants in

the subject vehicle and two occupants in the pickup truck which was parked contiguous.)
5.

This was an area of frequent criminal activity.

6.

His vision was severely restricted because of the darkness and the fact that all of

the windows were fogged up.
7.

The other vehicle was running and Officer Castleberry testified he believed the

subject vehicle had the engine on with a fifteen-year-old unlicensed girl behind the wheel and two
other passengers in the back seat.
Ultimately would it have been permissible for Officer Castleberry to shine a flashlight
through the passenger window for safety purposes? Yes. Then, since the window was fogged
and severely restricted his vision, was he then justified to open the door? It is the opinion of the
Court that under these circumstances the Officer was justified in opening the passenger door.
When he did so the bindle of drugs was in plain view. Inevitably the drugs may have been
discovered even if the defendant had retrieved the purse because the purse did not belong to her
and presumably did not contain her license.
The Mirquet ruling clarified factors to be considered by a Court in assessing whether a
defendant is in custody for purposes of Miranda.
The standard for determining when a defendant is "in custody" for
Miranda purposes is well settled. The safeguards prescribed by Miranda
become applicable as soon as a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a
degree associated with formal arrest. More specifically, Miranda warnings are
required whenever the circumstances of an interrogation are such that they
exert upon the detained person pressures that sufficiently impair his free
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exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be wrarned
of his constitutional rights.
The "not free to leave" standard, on the other hand, determines whether
a person has been "seized" under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. That standard is broader than the Miranda standard. A person
may be "seized" for Fourth Amendment purposes but not be "in custody" for
Fifth Amendment purposes. Whether one is "in custody" for Miranda
purposes depends on an objective assessment of the circumstances of the
interrogation with respect to the compulsory nature of the interrogation rather
than on the subjective intent or suspicions of the officers conducting the
examination.
In the context of a routine traffic stop, the driver and the passengers,
even though they have been stopped and, at least momentarily, are not free to
leave, are not "in custody" for Miranda purposes. That is true even though an
officer engages in some degree of accusatory questioning of the driver during
the course of the stop and even though the officer may have a subjective,
unstated intent to arrest the driver. . .
To guide the decision as to when one is in custody and entitled to a
Miranda warning prior to a formal arrest, Salt Lake City v. Carnen 664 P.2d
1168 (Utah 1983), set out four factors to be evaluated: 1) the site of the
interrogation; 2) whether the investigation focused on the accused; 3) whether
the objective indicia of arrest were present; and 4) the length and form of the
interrogation" . . .
In holding that Mirquet was in custody, the Court of Appeals, applying
the Carner factors, found that 1) the site of the interrogation was inside the
police car; 2) Officer Mangelson's investigation focused solely on defendant;
3) the objective indicia of arrest were present; 4) the form of the interrogation
evidenced a clear coercive intent on the part of the officer to prompt Mirquet
to produce incriminating contraband; and 5) the place of the interrogation
added to the coercive environment.
The facts support both these subordinate conclusions and the ultimate
conclusion that the defendant was "in custody." Id at 1146, 47 & 48.
(Emphasis added).
ISSUE NO- 2
At what point was the defendant in custody and the subject of an interrogation so
as to require the officer to administer Miranda warnings to the defendant?
-6£.1

Both sides rely upon the case of State v Mirquet 914 P.2d 1149 (Utah 1996). This
Court must apply the law contained in Mirquet to the facts of this case. The scenario of facts
presented by the State of Utah in its briefing seems to rely upon the officer's report, which is not
in evidence. The Court must rely upon the testimony at the hearing.
Likewise, the defendant relies upon "facts" that are not in evidence, such as "the
defendant was not experienced or knowledgeable regarding criminal procedure and the defendant
had never been arrested prior to this incident and had no criminal record." These facts are not in
evidence. Defense argues that Ms. Brake's "inexperience with the criminal justice system"
together with other circumstances mandate that the Miranda warning should have been prior to
interrogation.
Defendant further argues that a reasonable person in Miss Brake's shoes (knowledge,
experience, and understanding) would believe that they were the subject of a custodial
interrogation by Deputy Castlebeny. While that might be a correct statement of the law, there is
absolutely no testimony or evidence in the case respecting Ms. Brake's knowledge, experience
and understanding or her "inexperience with the criminal justice system." She did not testify at
the hearing and certainly there is no evidence that Deputy Castlebeny knew about or inquired
about her past criminal history, past drug use or her knowledge of the criminal justice system or
legal procedure. That would not have been permissible.
In the case at bar, Officer Castlebeny observed a white plastic bindle on the passenger
side front seat immediately after he opened the front door. He picked it up and asked who owned
it, to which no one responded. The bindle was next to a purse. When the officer asked who
owned the purse, the defendant, Ms. Brake or others, responded that the purse belonged to a
young woman in the second vehicle, the white truck. While Castlebeny was speaking with this
young woman, a backup officer, Deputy Chipman, arrived and Castlebeny directed him to search
the defendant's vehicle. As Officer Chipman was searching the defendant's vehicle, Castlebeny
spoke with several individuals including the defendant, Ms. Brake. He checked for signs of
-7-

cocaine use in various individuals and testified: "It appeared to me that all of the individuals that I
looked at exhibited signs of having used cocaine."
No one was "free to leave" while the officer asked questions. Applying the
Mirquet/Carner test the Court finds:
1.

The questioning took place at the remote site in Officer Castlebeny's patrol

2.

The investigation focused on all of the individuals in the two vehicles;

3.

There was no objective indicia of arrest; no handcuffing, no one being constrained

vehicle;

in a vehicle; no formal "you are under arrest" directive. In addition, there was nothing said which
attempted to coerce her or prompt her to retrieve incriminating evidence.
4.

The investigation was quite short and there was no coercive or accusatory

statements.
Accordingly, applying the four-pronged test, the Court does not find that Ms. Brake had
been "deprived of her freedom in any significant way" for purposes of Miranda warnings But
once she had admitted "the specific bindle was hers in addition to any cocaine that - the residue
that was found within the box. . . " the Miranda was implicated. It was not given at that stage and
should have been.
RULING
Defendant's Motion to Suppress is granted in part and denied in part. Counsel for the
State of Utah is directed to prepare an order consistent with this ruling.
The Clerk of the Court is instructed to calendar this case in order to set a jury trial.
Dated thi > *'

day of October, 2000.
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